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Abstract: This text represents a sequel to our demarche concerning the globalization phenomenon 
understood in the analytical theoretical perspective. The economic coordinate of globalization 
represents a highly important element for the theoretical outlining of the concept of globalization. The 
world‘s markets, especially the financial ones, represent the best proof that globalization encompasses 
a powerful economic component. In this context, the issue of the nation-state represents a new 
challenge for the theorists of globalization. Welfare, the certainty of the workplace, related to the 
phenomenon of global unemployment, represent only a few problematic concepts which require 
reflection, resemantization and an authentic intellectual debate. The sovereignty of the nation-state is 
seriously shaken especially from an economic perspective. All the other conceptual components of 
globalization are directly influenced in that ―multicausal logic‖ brought forth by Giddens, by this 
economic coordinate. The economic, as a semantic horizon which melts into the concept of 
globalization, may be related to another semantic horizon just as important, namely the cultural one. 
At a first superficial review, the two coordinates seem rather stuck in their strict specific identity, but, 
after a more profound analysis, the connections between them may be brought forth. Because we have 
mentioned the financial markets, which, at their turn, are instrumented by money, well, this economic 
instrument holds, in the first instance, a strong cultural charge. The most important forms of human 
behavior, namely the cultural ones, are directly influenced by the way the individual understands and 
interprets the concept called money. At the same time, we will not be able to overlook the fact that the 
most important states, from an economic point of view, the states initially making up G8, and then 
GX, are the states which ―set the style‖ for the various cultural trends and courses at a global level. 
These two coordinates analyzed in this text are interconnected, making up a first semantic horizon of 
globalization. 
Keywords: economic coordinate of globalization; cultural coordinate of globalization; Giddens; 
welfare system; nation-state 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major issues arising in the context of the economic dimension of 
globalization is given by the vision according to which the economic globalization 
undermines the ability of the national communities to maintain a certain level of 
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social welfare, based on the reallocation of resources towards those who cannot 
provide a decent living for themselves under the conditions of the market economy. 
Thus, it is assumed that the development of the global capitalism involves a fierce 
competition, which, at its turn, supposes a certain cutting down of the expenses 
aimed at ensuring the individuals‘ welfare. Certainly, this ―scenario‖ may be 
regarded as a pessimistic interpretation of the impact that the economic 
globalization has upon the nation-state. At the same time, we have to take into 
consideration its ideological fundament as well. However, we can first accept that 
the economic globalization truly implies the end of the welfare state and of the 
redistributive reforms, which tend to be replaced by a convergence concerning 
certain national policies targeting the market economy. Even more, it is considered 
that the exposure to the rigors of the global market does not create negative effects 
on the social expenses of the nation-state. For example, in a research conducted in 
14 industrialized countries between 1966 and 1990, Garret and Mitchell (Garret, 
Mitchell, 1996) discovered that, at least for this group of states, an increased 
exposure to the entrance on the domestic market of the foreign capital and to the 
international trade did not put pressure on the welfare expenses.  
The explanation of the two authors contains a two-stage argument. First, 
globalization increases the insecurity level for certain social segments, which leads 
to the increase of their expectations for a redistributive social support coming from 
the state. Second, the expenses for the insurance of welfare do not necessarily 
determine the disappearance of capital, because the countries with an increased 
social stability usually provide a safe environment for investors, as compared to the 
ones marked by instability. Therefore, the two authors conclude, the connection 
between the economic globalization and the social expenses is stronger in those 
countries in which there are powerful trade unions or labor movements and weaker 
right-wing parties. Or, this does not mean that the welfare state is not in crisis, but 
that the causes of this crisis are not fundamentally attributed to globalization. 
Despite such arguments, this pessimistic scenario concerning globalization finds 
new adepts. Thus, it is claimed that ―the delocalization of production, 
simplification, cutting down prices, firings, the high performance economy based 
on high-tech deprive the consumption society of labor and throw its consumers out 
in the street. An unprecedented economic and social shaking is about to take place. 
Be it the construction of vehicles or computers, chemistry or electronics, 
telecommunication or postal services, retail trade or finances, in any place of the 
world where some products or services are freely negotiated, without taking into 
consideration any boundary whatsoever, the employees get into the apparently 
unstoppable whirlpool of the depreciation of their worth and of rationality. In the 
three years between 1991 and 1994 alone, in the German industry in the western 
part of the country more than 1,000,000 work places were lost. And comparatively, 
Germany displays a stable position at an international level. In the other OECD 
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countries – organization made of 23 rich industrialized nations and five other 
somewhat poorer ones - the number of the well-paid jobs decreased even more 
rapidly. Over 40 million people in the OECD countries vainly searched for 
employment in 1996. From the US to Australia and from Great Britain to Japan, 
the mass welfare is quickly withdrawing within those nations which make the 
leading platoon of the world‘s economy‖. (Martin, Schumann, 1999, pp. 166-167) 
Thus, if such tendencies may be recognized in the case of the developed countries, 
which may come up with possible solutions to put an end to them, it is very 
unlikely that in the case of the states in transition towards the market economy or 
in integration processes into various supranational structures (such as Romania or 
other countries in Eastern Europe) the same would happen.  
 
2. Global Capitalism and National Economies 
Yet, there are also optimistic scenarios concerning the social globalization, which, 
at their turn, hold, subsidiarily, certain ideological grounds. Trying to promote the 
concept of ―politics of the third path‖ (a synthesis between the elements of the 
social democracy and those of the market liberalism), as a response to the 
challenges of the globalized world, Anthony Giddens considers that, in order to 
solve the global social problems, a ―new mixed economy‖ must be established. 
Giddens starts from the already existing versions of the mixed economy. (Giddens, 
2001, p. 78) One of these involves a separation between the state and the private 
sectors, keeping most of the industrial sector in the public domain. The other 
version mentioned by the British theorist is known under the name of ―social 
market economy‖, and Giddens underlines that, in both forms, the organization of 
the markets is subordinated to the governmental decisions taken. On the other 
hand, the new mixed economy tries to articulate a convergence between the 
interests of the public sector and the private‘s ones, using the dynamism of the 
markets and pursuing, at the same time, the public interest (Giddens, 2001, p. 100). 
Besides, the new mixed economy supposes the existence of a balance between the 
settlement and unsettlement of markets, both at a transnational level (globally), and 
at a national or local level, as well as a balance at the level of the relations existing 
between the economic, and non-economic, respectively, sectors of society.  
Certainly, a dynamic global economy is marked by a high rate of commercial, 
financial, and other transactions, but also by the appearance of possible 
dissolutions or crises. From this point of view, a dynamic flow of economy is not 
compatible with a society in which the individuals are used with being given 
everything by the state, such as those societies generated by the ―system‖ of 
general welfare (welfare system). From the same ideological perspective of the 
third path, Giddens supports a modification of the relation between the matters of 
risk and of social security, in order to build a society in which there should exist 
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―agents in charge of the risk coverage‖ in the governmental, business community 
or labor market spheres. This because the people from various communities, 
undoubtedly affected by the economic globalization, need protection when things 
do not work properly, as they also need moral and material capabilities to help 
them overpass such transient moments (Giddens, 2001, p. 101). The issue of 
equality also intercedes here, as long as, even in a globalized world, liberty and 
equality may come into conflict; so it cannot be claimed that equality, pluralism, 
and the economic dynamism are always compatible. On the contrary, Giddens 
claims, being determined by the structural changes of the economic and social 
globalization, the increase of inequality is not easy to confute.  
On the other hand, the politics of the third path cannot accept the idea that a high 
degree of social inequality actually means economic prosperity, or that inequality is 
inevitable. Even so, equality, where it may be sustained, must encourage diversity, 
and not hinder it. As it may be noticed, in the optimistic scenario proposed by 
Anthony Giddens, reallocation still plays an important part, even under the terms of 
the social globalization, or especially under these terms. Besides, in a further paper, 
which aims to be an answer to the criticisms coming in response to the 
advancement of the concept of ―politics of the third path‖, Giddens will return to 
the importance of the nation-state as a global agent, whose part, among others, is 
also the redistributive one, of social protection of the disadvantaged ones (Giddens, 
2000, p. 120).  
Considering his ideological proposition a ―globalized political philosophy‖ 
(Giddens, 2000, p. 122), Giddens claims that this type of politics is meant to 
promote global integration, since the progress of globalization, on all its 
coordinates, is more accelerated than ever. In this context, the author points out, the 
nation-states stay the most important actors on the international stage, although the 
profits of the large multinational companies are higher than the NGP of many 
states. And this because, ―generally, the nation-states are much more powerful. The 
reasons are that they control their territory, while the corporations do not; they may 
resort to the legitimate use of military force, individually or by alliance; they are 
responsible, again, individually or collectively, for the support of a legislative 
apparatus‖ (Giddens, 2000, pp. 122-123). However, Giddens asserts, the global 
system cannot be analyzed at the level of the nation-states alone, as long as their 
sovereignty claims are questioned. Together with the powerful influence the global 
market and the new communication technology exert, there is also a ―globalization 
from bottom to top‖ (Giddens, 2000, p. 124), which includes hundreds of millions 
of regular people, as well as organized groups of all types. Thus, there is the 
tendency to develop a global civil society, tendency proven by the rising number of 
the global non-governmental organizations; if, in 1950, there were two or three 
hundred such organizations, at the end of the century, their number surpassed 
10,000. 
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The question which arises in the context of this optimistic scenario proposed by the 
principal of the famous London School of Economics and Political Science is the 
following: what type of global developments must the politics of the third path 
promote? At an abstract level, Giddens shows, the answer to this question is the 
same, whether we are talking about the national or the local level: a harmonious 
global order implies a balance between governments, economy, and the civil 
society. As long as these ties do not exist, the social society shall be unstable. The 
social problems generated by globalization are also due to the fact that in many 
countries and in some regions of the globe there is not any developed civil society 
yet, and the democratic structures are not consolidated (the reference to the Eastern 
European area is obvious). In the absence of the above, the chances for an effective 
economic development are scarce, which leads to an increase in the number of 
social issues.  
The solution suggested by the British theorist to such issues concerns the 
encouragement of the international collaboration on several directions: the 
organization of the global economy, the global ecological management, the 
regulation of the limits of the power detained by transnational corporations, the 
control of the potential war zones, and the implementation of certain democratic 
structures. From the ideological stand of a new form of social democracy, which 
holds global connotations, Giddens‘ optimistic scenario brings as arguments the 
developmental stages of the global economy, as well as the solving of certain social 
issues which marked certain areas of the globe (Giddens, 2000, pp. 124-132). From 
this perspective, the economic globalization, examined at a general level, is 
considered a success, which is also reflected in the social plane, on the labor 
market and related to the individuals' welfare. The matter of the new mixed 
economy is how its positive consequences may be maximized, with a parallel 
limitation of its less fortunate effects. Among the positive consequences, very 
important is the increase of the work places on the global labor market, which was 
resented in the last two decades, despite the high unemployment rate in certain 
countries or regions. Besides, the global labor force increased, between 1980 and 
1994, to 630 million people, a lot over the increase rate of the number of the 
world‘s population. In this period, Giddens shows, only the Chinese economy, for 
instance, generated around 15 million new work places annually. Despite the recent 
crises, the fast development of the economies in the Asian countries saved millions 
of people from poverty.  
The improvement of life conditions is proven by the decrease of the infantile 
mortality and the increase of the life span; thus, the infantile mortality in South 
Korea decreased from 62 per thousand in 1965 to only 12 per thousand in 1994, 
while the life span increased from 54 to 71 years. As a researcher in the field of the 
social market economy points out, ―what demonstrates the evolutions in the last 30 
years is that the new global economy holds a huge potential, representing an 
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alternative to poverty and underdevelopment, and that to come is the 
transformation of more and more countries into dynamic elements of an expansive 
economy‖ (Rojas, 1999, p. 12).  
However, the mechanisms of the global economy are, for the moment, inclined 
towards the rich states, particularly the developed democracies that, together with 
Russia, form G8. The group that is trying to reestablish the balance, formed in 
September 1999 and called GX, includes the countries in G8, plus China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and South Africa. Giddens claims that it is possible 
that this new group become the most important institution from the point of view of 
the global economy, as it will also work with the International Monetary Fund. 
Such ―global innovations‖ are important, as long as the distance between the rich 
and the poor countries is still large. But this, the British theorist shows, is not 
necessarily due to the economic globalization, but especially to the internal causes 
existent in various societies, namely authoritarian government, corruption, 
excessive bureaucratization, social tensions, and the low level of women‘s 
emancipation. The author argues that the economic development cannot be 
analyzed in the absence of the references to the contributions that health and 
education, as well as civil liberty and politics, have brought to the individuals‘ 
welfare. As such, the social capability measures development in terms of the 
freedom of speech, the right to vote and the lack of violence or political 
persecution.  
The development of a country may best be accomplished by instrumentalizing the 
political and civil rights and by the investments in the fields of health and 
education. Moreover, the author claims that democracy is the best advocate against 
poverty, as no truly democratic state has ever experienced poverty and hunger. 
Without promising an ideal world, the optimistic scenario concerning the economic 
and social globalization seeks to demonstrate that, while - with an expression 
belonging to Karl Popper, - ―in search for a better world‖, the people of the 21st 
century may develop a global social space in which poverty and inequality should 
be, if not completely dismissed, at least alleviated. After all, social inequality 
seems to be the most important problem in the context of the contemporary debates 
concerning the social-historic process of globalization. If we can no longer speak 
of the existence of a state of general welfare, and, by extension, a ―global system of 
welfare‖, does this mean that we are heading, at the beginning of the third 
millennium, towards a new era of inequalities? This question, which sends to the 
content of the second part of this chapter, practically tries to shape one of the 
greatest fears of the social theorists who purported to foresee or describe the effects 
of the globalization process. 
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3. Consequences of the New Global Economy 
The social analyses which subside to the negative scenario mentioned in the 
previous section suggest either a fatality which invokes an ineluctable nature of the 
economic transformations, or a refusal attitude which attributes all the evils 
existent in the contemporary societies to the globalization process, which would 
nourish resorting to certain protectionist policies that the nation-state could no 
longer support. The general idea suggested by the pessimistic scenario seems to be 
that the economic globalization reduces the influence of the national governments 
on the economic activities of their own citizens, without being able to guarantee, at 
the same time, the maintenance of a social consensus concerning the desirability of 
the global intervention in matters pertaining to the domestic economy. (Holton, 
1997, p. 95) Moreover, it is argued that the national governments have fewer 
alternatives in negotiating with the multinational companies, for example, if they 
are interested in optimizing the level of the economic growth and maintaining a 
certain living standard for their citizens. Accordingly, the fatality would be that the 
contemporary experience prove to us that a certain type of commitment as 
compared to the global capitalist economy and, thus, to the global market, is 
unavoidable for the nation-states. However, what is needed here is not a solution 
which would imply a ―confinement‖ of the national economies following the 
pattern of the ―communist world‖, which sought the performance of a project 
according to which the planned economies could have resisted outside the global 
capitalist system. Such a solution actually caused a worsening of the economic and 
social problems in these countries, before the ‗90s, which finally led to the 
implosion of the system.  
Today, China opened its economy towards the global market, and maybe only such 
states as Cuba or North Korea are still outside the global market. But the question 
is: what costs must the citizens of these countries bear? Certainly, the issue of the 
economic-social inequalities that the structural modifications of the global 
economy suppose does not represent only the privilege of the ―problem-states‖. On 
the contrary, the states with a developed economy are also confronted with such 
problems; the advantage is, however, that a dynamic economy allows for the 
implementation of certain solutions to diminish or attenuate inequalities. However, 
the question if our era is or will become one of inequalities remains. And this 
because, if the nation-states can no longer protect their citizens against the 
tendencies of the global economy, meaning that they can no longer offer certainties 
as to the work places and living standards (if such certainties existed, they were 
owed, some theorists suggest, to ―the system of the providence states‖ after the 
war), it means that the idea of social contract itself must be redefined. Even more, 
the resemantization, even the reinvention of the social contract involves, it may be 
said, even a redefinition of the social. 
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In the sociological literature, as well as in the politological one, it is suggested that 
the existence of a nation-state crisis in a globalization era practically involves a 
redefinition of the social, in tight relation with the appearance of new types of 
inequality, as well as new types of social exclusion. Faced with this finding, two 
perspectives are basically developed. The first one, belonging to Etienne Balibar 
and Robert Castel, understands exclusion as an extreme form of inequality (Castel, 
Balibar, 1992, p. 115). The second one, developed by Alain Touraine, showed that 
both exclusion, and inequality, represent processes that pertain to different contexts 
of the economic-social space. Continuing this idea, the following legitimate 
question arises: what kind of social-economic space are we dealing with in the 
context of the globalization process? As we have shown in the analytical 
framework of the conceptualization of globalization, we are no longer dealing with 
the space specific to modernity, reduced to the territorial boundaries of the nation-
state. Under the terms of modernity, a protectionist pattern used to operate, with a 
certain degree of success: ―As long as the economic space and the political and 
social ones overlapped, the protectionist project was enough to give meaning and 
consistency to the idea of nation.‖ (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 1999, p. 149)  
In the context of globalization, however, the situation appears deeply modified, the 
consequence being that ―the increasing dissociation of economy and the political 
suddenly invites us to reestablish the political contract among citizens in a more 
autonomous manner. The latter is no longer only the mechanical extension of the 
exchange and must find its principles more directly, in the affirmation of the 
common life.‖ (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 1999, p. 150) Or, a common life refers today 
not only to the local and national ―loyalties‖, but also to the global relations in 
which a lot of individuals are involved, as well as various social groups. Moreover, 
common life supposes today that the law of the global market, having another kind 
of influence than the law of the nation-states, conjugated with the opening towards 
the world, dilutes every country into an undifferentiated ensemble, in which no 
national society masters its destiny. Although this situation shows us that, indeed, 
―mundialization separates the ones who adapt to the world from the ones who 
cannot do it and constrains us to show ourselves less solidary in order to deal with 
the opening of economy‖ (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 1999, p. 125), this does not mean 
that we have to resort to some manicheist oppositions or reductionist schemes. 
Maybe the impact of the social globalization is felt more acutely, under the form of 
the various types of inequality and exclusion, because the postwar world, at least in 
the European space, got us used with thinking in the terms of the protectionist 
system of the providence state. The crisis of this system, generated by the 
economic and social globalization, does not however mean that solutions to solve 
the new social problems cannot be found. 
The social theorists consider that, having arrived at a point when a redefinition of 
the social contract is needed, and, by this, of the social itself, three common aspects 
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are highlighted, concerning the relation between the economic and the social, the 
nature of the social rights and the definition of the social‘s ―topics‖. In the case of 
the first aspect, the notion of ―the third sector‖ is invoked, situated between the 
global market and the nation-state, which gets a more social connotation, related to 
the idea of integrating the individuals and communities on the global market. The 
second aspect concerns the reanalysis of the social rights from a contractualist 
perspective, rights and obligations standing out. Finally, the third aspect shows us 
the fact that the nation-state, providential or not, is confronted to a true revolution 
of its representations: ―it must endorse individuals to an ever smaller extent and 
groups to an ever bigger extent‖. (Rosanvallon, 1998, p. 121) The last relevant 
aspect pertains to what Pierre Rosanvallon calls the ever more difficult 
―deciphering of the social‖ – the global communication techniques, as well as the 
sociological statistics, offer us plenty of information concerning the individuals, 
but tell us very little about groups and communities. Or, this is where the 
redefinition of the social must practically begin, under the new conditions of 
globalization, because inequality and exclusion, if and where they exist, are felt 
more acutely at the level of the social groups. Still, we appreciate that eluding the 
issue of the individual would mean approaching a holistic understanding of the 
matter in question. Therefore, we will opt for a neutral perspective, which should 
refer both to the social problems of the groups and communities, and to the ones 
which may be perceived at an individual level. This because a globalized society 
―is especially characterized by an astonishing reorganization of the differentiation 
manners, which are no longer just collective (expressed by income categories, 
study diplomas, etc.) but become more individualized‖ (Rosanvallon, 1998, p. 
138). 
Thus, the redefinition of the social starts from the finding that ―the surplus needed 
by mundialization is only acquired by paying the price of a considerable, maybe 
unknown, deepening of inequalities‖ (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 1999, pp. 126-127) 
According to this deal, the financial globalization would determine the deepening 
of the structural inequalities, as it leads to another division between profits and 
income, in the industrialized countries. Second, the globalization of the goods 
markets, worldwide, and not only in the rich countries, contributes to the 
explanation of the deepening of the dynamic inequalities. The consequences 
thereof are that unemployment and poverty rise among the workers with no 
qualification whatsoever or with a weaker qualification in the rich countries, while 
the same workers, but in the less developed countries, see their fate improve. Thus 
we note the existence of two types of inequalities. On the one side, there is, in the 
contemporary society, a series of structural inequalities (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 
1999, pp. 75-78), inherited from a distant past, partially interiorized by society, 
which are today worsened by the fact that the negotiation power of the employees 
or their representative instances decreased under the burden of mass 
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unemployment. On the other side, we have the dynamic inequalities, which, when 
they rise in intensity and persistence, determine, at their turn, a modification in the 
structure of society and in the representations that the individual makes of it. Here 
is the example offered by Fitoussi si Rosanvallon concerning such intracategorical 
inequalities (which come from the requalification of the differences within the 
categories so far considered homogenous), in order to highlight the way in which 
inequality creates the feeling of exclusion: ―A higher education employee in long 
term unemployment does not live, for sure, their situation in relation to the 
diminishing of their income: they first feel excluded from the world of the higher 
education employees, without getting to believe that they belong to any other 
category. So, their identity is questioned as well.‖ (Fitoussi, Rosanvallon, 1999, pp. 
75-78) The conclusion is that globalization multiplies uncertainties, generating 
various types of inequality and exclusion. The map of the global inequality is, no 
doubt about it, a multidimensional one; it concerns both the geographical 
inequalities between the various countries and regimes, as well as other types of 
―classical‖ inequalities, among the ―new‖ ones already mentioned: among 
generations, of the social contributions, the access to the financial system, daily 
life, etc.  
But what the social theorists underline is the idea that such problems do not come 
from the fact that globalization occurs, but from the one that this process is not yet 
accompanied by any mechanism of international cooperation, which should 
emphasize its beneficial effects. Because there certainly are such effects, which 
induces the conclusion that the process must be encouraged, and not stopped. 
Globalization undoubtedly poses difficulties, because it emphasizes the 
inegalitarian tendencies which come forth even in the developed states, making the 
exercise of the political power more complex, but it does not involve giving up the 
economic growth. Thus, there is hope that an economic growth within reasonable 
limits may finally determine the attenuation of the social inequalities. From this 
perspective, Anthony Giddens considers that the politics of the third path may offer 
solutions to this regard. (Giddens, 2001, p. 103)  
The main problem in which the British theorist is interested is the necessity to 
reform the ―system of the general welfare‖, which implies three motivations. First 
of all, the current structures of this system have become obsolete, as compared to 
the global economic and social changes. The dynamics of inequalities is also 
different from the one of the modernity, as are the social risks which must be 
covered. Thus, on the labor market, the number of women increased, the relation 
between work and family life changed, the educational possibilities and needs 
changed as well, and the increase of the life span, as well as the proliferation of the 
medical treatments transformed the health systems, but bringing new issues into 
focus. Then, at least in what some of its aspects and certain countries are 
concerned, the providence-state can no longer be supported. Instead of creating a 
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higher social solidarity, under the new global conditions, the institutions of the 
welfare state may undermine it. For example, it is well known that the pension 
commitments of some states, such as Germany, Italy, or Japan, are practically 
unaccomplishable, even if there were not any changes in the demographic 
tendencies. (Giddens, 2001, p. 110) Other states reached a very high level of debts, 
so that budgets are spent mainly to cover them, and thus social services are out of 
the question.  
These situations, Gidden shows, fuel the new social conflicts, such as riots of the 
tax payers, conflicts among generations, tensions between the ones integrated into 
the system and the ones left out. Third, the welfare system has its own limits and 
contradictions, which must be eliminated. The approach to all of these issues, 
which Giddens suggests from the ideological perspective of the politics of the third 
path, concerns both the aspect of the social equality, and the one of pluralism, 
underlining the importance of a ―dynamic model of egalitarianism‖. (Giddens, 
2001, p. 120) This is focused, in the first instance, on the equality of opportunities, 
underlining that it involves, still, some mechanisms of economic reallocation. At 
the same time, the model tries to answer the changing influences manifesting in the 
inequality area. As such, the state must not only ―react‖ to inequality and poverty, 
but also intervene in the life circumstances of the groups and individuals involved, 
when the case may be. The restructuring of the welfare system and, by this, the 
redefinition of the social, must be accompanied by several consequences - saving 
costs, where it is necessary, but also the reaction to the new global economic and 
social conditions. Besides, the economic and social policies can no longer be 
understood as belonging to separate compartments. In this sense, social expenses 
must be analyzed in the terms of the consequences they have on the economic area 
(this being one of the reasons why certain governments confer so much importance 
to what it is called ―the policy of welfare through work‖).  
At the same time, the issues of social exclusion must also be examined, this 
examination being followed by a reaction going both from top to bottom and from 
bottom to top; redefining inequality in relation to exclusion, as Fitoussi si 
Rosanvallon suggest, is, therefore, consistent. Giddens‘s conclusion is that, just 
like in other areas of the social policies, the matter of inequalities can no longer be 
solved today only at a national or local level. On the contrary, the matters 
pertaining to the global economy, as well as to the regulation of the power held by 
the multinational corporations, must be related to the matter of the inequalities. It is 
hoped that thus certain practical solutions to the practical issues of globalization 
will be identified, both from an economic point of view, and especially a social 





4. Technology and Creation of the Cultural Global Space 
There are a few features generally accepted as characterizing ―the cultural‖, on 
which we may count to understand correctly what goes into the cultural dimension 
of globalization. First of all, culture may be understood as a sphere of existence in 
which people build the significance through the practices of symbolic 
representation. Although this assertion rather sounds like a hollow generalization, it 
allows us to make a few useful delimitations. Quite generally, if we are talking 
about the economic, we are interested in the practices by which people produce, 
exchange, and consume material goods; if we are talking about the political, we 
refer to the practices by which power is concentrated, distributed, and used within 
societies, and if we are talking about culture, we refer to the ways in which people 
give meaning to their lives, individually or collectively, through communication 
among them. All these are ―dimensions‖ of social life and not completely distinct 
activity spheres: people do not pass from ―sparing money‖ to ―making culture‖ the 
same way they pass from daily work to recreational activities. If things were such, 
then we should assume that no one has ever extracted any significance from the 
activities they perform to earn their living. And yet, this thinking pattern is deeply 
rooted in the common visions on culture, which refer to the practices and products 
of art, literature, music, film, etc. (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 32)  
All of these are important manners by which specific significances are generated, 
but they cannot exclusively define the cultural dimension. We must rather extract, 
from the complexity of the interwoven practices of the cultural, economic, and 
political fields, a feeling of the culture‘s purpose: that of giving life a meaning. But 
all that may be symbolized is, in a broad sense, significant. For example, there is a 
great number of symbols attached to the economic practices, such as the technical 
language of the production process (for example, the technical specifications of a 
vehicle‘s engine) or of the market (for example, the daily announcement of share 
prices). But it may be considered that these symbolizations do not reach the center 
of the ―cultural‖ and that most of this area of the instrumental symbolization may 
be assigned to the economic, technical, and so on.  
On the other hand, numerous symbolic representations in marketing are very 
cultural, although they ultimately have an instrumental (economic) purpose. 
Advertising texts, for example, although they belong to what Horkheimer and 
Adorno used to call, deprecatingly, ―the industry of culture‖, related to the 
instrumental purposes of capitalism, stay significant cultural texts. The way in 
which advertising texts are used is often similar to the one in which novels or 
movies are used. And this because it offers narrations (no matter how suspicious 
these would be, from an ideological point of view) on the way in which life can be 
lived, references to common notions of identity, appeals to one‘s own image, 
images of some ideal human relationships, versions of fulfillment, happiness, etc. 
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This is the sense of the cultural dimension that we seek to underline along this 
study, the focus being on the sense as purpose in itself, different from the strictly 
instrumental senses. To use a little exaggerated expression, we may conceive 
culture, in this sense, as being the territory of the meanings ―significant from an 
existential point of view‖. (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 33) By this we do not intend to 
highlight ―the issue of existence‖ as it is expressed by the ontological concerns of 
the existentialist philosophy or the formal religious reactions to the human 
condition. No matter how important they would be for the way in which people 
interpret their lives – and without taking into account the importance of 
globalization for the religious institutions - they are, we could say, existential 
discourses too specialized to capture what we intend to highlight in the idea of 
significant meaning from an existential point of view. To this we must add the 
famous expression ―culture is common‖. Of course, this expression has been 
initially used in opposition to the elitist acceptation of culture, as a ―special‖, 
refined form of life, only available to the few, through ―cultivating‖ certain 
sensitivities. Therefore, culture is common, in the ―democratic anthropological‖ 
meaning that is describes ―an entire way of life‖: it is not the exclusive property of 
the privileged ones, but includes the variety of daily practices (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 
34). But what is important, this meaning coexists with the one according to which 
culture offers ―personal meanings‖: ―The questions that I ask concerning our 
culture are questions related to the general and common purposes, but also 
questions on the deeply personal meanings. Culture is common, in any society and 
in any mind‖. (Wallerstein, 1990, pp. 31-55)  
The principle according to which ―culture is common‖ takes shape as what is 
included in the problems of the existential significance that any man raises, usually, 
in their daily practices and experiences. It is not about the fact that some symbolic 
practices are more edifying than others, or closer to the essence of the human 
condition, or more concerned with the great questions of life. Nor is it about the 
cultural or aesthetical value in relation to certain cultural texts. Tao-te-king, 
Beethoven‘s last quartets, or a painting of Picasso‘s are not ―cultural texts‖ to a 
greater or lesser extent than a TV series such as NYPD Blue, or a Pussycat Dolls 
album, or the feature reports on Princess Diana‘s death, or the football magazines, 
or the most recent commercial of the Levi‘s brand. All of these are cultural texts to 
the extent that people value them to understand their existence. And, of course, we 
must include in this approach of culture all sorts of practices, which do not depend 
on a relation between the reader and the text: visiting a supermarket, or the walk to 
the restaurant, a gym hall, a dance club or a park, the conversation in a bar or in the 
corner of the street. For the purposes of our discussion, culture refers to all the 
common practices which directly contribute to the development of the ―life 
narrations‖ of people: the stories by which we chronically interpret our own 
existence, in what Heidegger calls ―the throwing state‖ (Geworfenheit) of human 
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condition. If we approach connexity from this perspective, we are interested in the 
way globalization changes the context of building the meaning: the way in which it 
affects the sense of identity, the experience of the place and self in relation to the 
place, the impact it has on understanding, values, wishes, myths, hopes, and fears 
which developed around a topical life. The cultural dimension, therefore, 
comprises what Anthony Giddens used to call both the ―exteriority‖, and the 
―interiority‖ of globalization: the relation between the ample systematic 
transformations and the transformations of our most intimate and most local 
―worlds‖ in the daily experience. (Giddens, 2001, p. 29) 
One of the reasons why, we believe, it must be insisted on this way of 
understanding the cultural dimension is that the discussions on globalization often 
consider ―culture‖ as being something somewhat different, replacing it by the 
audio-visual technologies and the globalizing technologies, by which the cultural 
representations are transmitted. This tendency best stands out, probably, in the 
journalistic discourse, widely spread, on globalization, which often seems obsessed 
with the ―ingeniousness‖ of the new communication technologies: the Internet, 
global informational line, etc. Yet, although the communicational technologies are 
absolutely essential for the globalization process, their development is not identical 
to the cultural globalization. In fact, the implications of their impact are both wide 
and narrow. Wide because they have a significant role – like technology itself and, 
thus, like transmitters or instrumental symbolizations – in all the dimensions in 
which globalization manifests. An example in this direction would be the ever 
higher integration of the global practices of obtaining the news and providing 
market information within the global economic trade. But the implications are 
narrow as well, because the mass-media represent only a part of the integral 
process by which the building of symbolic meanings manifests and only one of the 
forms by which globalization expresses from a cultural point of view. The mass–
media and the other types of mediated communication become more and more 
significant in our daily life, but they are not the only source of globalized cultural 
experience. And, to an equal extent, not all it may be said about the globalization of 
the audio-visual and of the communication systems is directly relevant to the 
discussions on culture. Quite surprisingly, we can find an example of combination 
of culture with its technologies in the study on globalization elaborated and 
provided by Anthony Giddens.  
Towards the end of a long discussion about the institutional dimensions of 
globalization, Giddens mentions ―(...) another fundamental aspect of globalization 
which runs in the background of the various institutional dimensions (...) and to 
which we could refer as cultural globalization‖. (Giddens, 2000, p. 75)  But the 
reader who is looking for a theory of culture defined as a process of building the 
meaning will be disappointed: Giddens only discusses the way in which ―the 
mechanized communication technologies have dramatically influenced all the 
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aspects of globalization‖. He underlines the importance of the totalized information 
for the global expansion of the institutions of modernity, and, significantly, takes as 
main example the instrumental context of the global financial markets. This, as 
well as the fact that the discussion about culture (on one page, at the most) is 
stuffed at the end of a long discussion about industrialism, rather shows an interest 
in the ―dislocating‖ properties of the communication technologies than in culture, 
in the sense of social production of a significant meaning from an existential point 
of view. We must say that Giddens did not pay too much attention to the concept of 
culture in his paper on globalization and this may explain the hazardous mistaking 
of culture for the communication technologies. But this example illustrates the 
importance of a clear delimitation of the elastic and comprehensive concept of 
―culture‖ in relation to globalization. Certainly, it may be accepted that the cultural 
globalization is ―fundamental‖ to globalization, but this may be analyzed in much 
broader terms than the ones offered by the mere analysis of the impact of the 
communication technologies - no matter how significant they would be for the 
institutional and systemic connexity of our world. Next, we shall try to suggest 
how this may be accomplished. 
 
5. The Role of Culture in the Context of Globalization 
Culture is important to globalization in the clear meaning that it represents the 
intrinsic aspect of the whole process of complex connexity. But we can go even 
farther. We can try to understand to what extent culture really constitutes the 
complex connexity. Again, there are so many right and wrong ways to approach 
this matter. An obvious risk is that we may make the mistake of conferring culture 
a certain degree of causal priority, favoring this dimension. We find such an 
example in Malcolm Waters‘ paper, who, after setting the standard distinction 
economy/politics/culture in the terms of a series of material – political and 
symbolic, respectively, exchange relations, claims somewhat provocatively, that: 
the material exchanges localize; the political ones institutionalize; and the symbolic 
exchanges globalize.  
The conclusion is that the globalization of the human society is conditioned to the 
extent in which the cultural relations are effective in relation to the economic and 
political arrangements. We may expect that the political economy be globalized to 
the extent in which these ones are culturalized, meaning the extent in which the 
exchanges which develop within the framework thereof  are accomplished 
symbolically. At the same time, we may expect that the globalization degree be 
higher in the cultural arena than in any of the other two. (Waters, 1995, p. 9) 
Waters‘ justification for the fact that he favors culture this way is, briefly, that, by 
their nature, the symbolic exchanges are far less restricted by the constraints of 
place than the material (economic) or political ones. For example, he claims that 
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the material exchanges are ―rooted in the localized markets, factories, offices, and 
stores‖ simply because of the practical necessity or the cost advantage of the 
physical proximity in the production and exchange of goods and services. Unlike 
these constraints, which ―tend to relate the economic exchanges to localities‖, the 
cultural symbols ―may be produced anywhere and anytime and there are very few 
constraints from the point of view of the resources involved in their production and 
reproduction‖. (Waters, 1995, p. 10) Thus, culture is, intrinsically, more 
globalizing, due to the fact that the relations it involves may easily ―expand‖ and 
due to the inherent mobility of the cultural forms and products. 
But this argument is not very convincing. Because there is obviously a variety of 
examples – the impact of the multinational corporations, the international division 
of labor (involved, for example, in the production of vehicles or the clothing 
industry), the rising phenomenon of the labor force migration, the financial trade 
and the trade of goods, the importance of the agreements regulating the 
international trade and the importance of the control bodies, such as GATT, and, 
currently, the World Trade Organization) – which prove the globalization of the 
―material exchanges‖ involved in the economic relations.  
Obviously, there are numerous cases when the production, exchange, and 
consumption of goods really stay relatively local activities, but a short walk to the 
nearby department store will quickly reveal how many of those products are not 
local. Certainly, it is true that any production must be located somewhere in the 
world. But this does not hinder the globalization process, as several well-known 
cases prove, such as the one of the intensive production of green peas in such 
countries as Zimbabwe for Europe‘s exclusive use or the 17,000 mile voyage of the 
Australian parsnip to Great Britain to make the product available all year long. 
(Tomlinson, 2002, p. 36) Similarly, the idea that the economic exchanges take 
place freely, without any material constraint, could indicate a strangely idealistic 
view - for is it not true that symbolizations must, eventually, take a material shape, 
of books, compact discs, celluloid, electronic impulses on the television or video 
screens, etc.? Although, obviously, the electronically mediatized ―products‖ are, 
from a technical point of view, much more mobile, all the processes of material 
production related to these various cultural forms certainly suppose constraints 
similar to the ones involved in any other form of production of goods. These 
objections question the plausibility of the quite extravagant generalization of 
Waters‘ concerning the localizing and globalizing features of the various social 
spheres. (Tomlinson, Timisoara, 2002, p. 37) But, on a more careful examination, 
it is shown that he rather sustains a much more modest fact: simply that the 
economic sectors in which mediation has the greatest symbolic character or, in his 
words, which are ―symbolized‖ - for instance, the financial markets – are the ones 
most subjected to globalization. This is a much more plausible idea, because it is 
obvious that the movement of some symbols, such as money, through electronic 
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means is much easier than the movement of some large quantities of root 
vegetables. But does this prove in any way the idea that, in the globalization 
process, culture plays a predominant part? This cannot be affirmed. At least, not in 
that meaning of culture that we have defined. Because, in this case, Waters is using 
culture focusing on the instrumental symbolization rather than on the construction 
of meanings significant from an existentialist point of view. We can agree that 
some economic processes get to be more strongly ―symbolized‖, but this simply 
means that they are more informationalized - the symbolizations used are intrinsic 
to the economic process - not that they are ―culturalized‖. If they were more 
culturalized, the processes and practices by which people nourish with meaningful 
recounts of their social existence would become somewhat more tightly related to 
the economic sphere. This may be so, but this argument must rely on something 
else than the debatable claim that the nature of the symbolic goods is 
―dematerialized‖. Thus, it might be proven that Waters is right in that which 
concerns the general significance of culture within the framework of globalization, 
but for other reasons. (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 38) 
The issue of understanding culture as a constitutive part of globalization depends 
on the way in which we conceive culture and its consequences. Culture is not a 
power which could represent the cause of social events, when we consider that the 
cultural processes equal the construction of meanings or a context in which events 
may be described in an intelligible way. If we think strictly in ―causal‖ terms, we 
are prone to taking culture for its technologies. Which does not however mean that 
culture is not deprived of important consequences. It certainly has important 
consequences to the extent in which the construction of meaning inspires collective 
and individual actions, themselves bearing consequences.  
The meanings are not produced by a completely separated interpretative channel, 
which, to put it that way, functions in parallel with other social practices without 
altering them. Significance and the cultural intepretation guide individuals towards 
certain actions, individually or collectively. Our actions, even if they are relatively 
instrumental, obeying a logic of practical or economic necessity often take place in 
the context of an ampler cultural understanding. Not even the elementary 
instrumental actions, which meet the bodily necessities, are outside culture, from 
this point of view: in certain circumstances (weight loss diet, religious fasting, 
hunger strike), the decision to eat or fast is a cultural one. We may understand the 
capacity of culture to bear consequences on globalization following the way in 
which the ―local‖ actions of a cultural inspiration may have globalizing 
consequences. The complex connexity does not only mean the tighter integration of 
the social institutions, but it involves the integration of the individual and collective 
actions in the effective manner of functioning of institutions. Thus, cultural 
connexity introduces the idea of the reflexivity of the global modern life. The core 
idea of the reflexivity theories, as that of Giddens (Giddens, 2000, p. 45), is that the 
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social activities have a recursive nature: it may be said that the social entities 
indirectly act upon themselves, in various ways, in order to adapt to the 
information received concerning their own behavior or functioning. This idea is 
based on the inherent reflexivity of the human being: the ability of all people to be 
constantly aware that they are acting right during the development of action, ―to 
constantly keep in touch with the reason in the name of which they act as an 
integrant element of action.‖ (Giddens, 2000, p. 39) 
The social theories on reflexivity try to explain how this type of self-monitoring 
manifests at the level of the social institutions or rather at the level of the 
interconnection between the social agents and institutions. According to Giddens‘ 
theory, this takes place within the framework of the ―institutional reflexivity‖: in 
the modern institutions, ―the social practices are constantly examined and 
reformulated, in the light of the information on these practices, thus modifying 
their nature‖. (Giddens, 2000, p. 41) As such, the modern institutions are, more and 
more, ―entities which learn‖, just like the human beings. It is precisely this 
reflexive sensitivity of the institutions as to the contribution of the human agents 
which marks the dynamism specific to the modern social life and defines the 
connexity between the multitude of the individual local actions and the global 
structures and processes at the highest level. In order to illustrate this idea, we can 
analyze a statement made by Giddens in relation to the ―local-global dialectics‖.  
Giddens writes that ―the local life habits got to have consequences at a global level. 
Thus, my decision to buy a certain garment has implications not only on the 
international division of labor, but also on the Earth‘s ecosystems.‖ (Giddens, 
2000, p. 41) How is this statement true? First of all, meaning that the global 
clothing industry is a highly reflexive institution, adapting to the options of a great 
number of actors expressing on the goods market by the cultural codes of fashion. 
If we are to think, for example, about the consequences of the cultural options of a 
group of teenagers, in a European commercial complex, on a Saturday afternoon, 
concerned with the look that they will have that evening, at the local club, we can 
notice that this unwraps a level of connexity leading to employment perspectives 
for a worker in the Philippines. And secondly, the connexity it involves is, actually, 
that the dressing options, just like any other consumption option, have global 
ecological consequences concerning the natural resources that they consume and 
the industrial production processes they suppose. Thus, a world defined by a 
complex connexity (a global goods market, international fashion codes, an 
international division of labor, a common ecosystem) ties a myriad of small daily 
activities, carried out by millions of people, to the destinies of other unknown 
people, far away, and even to the possible fate of the planet. All these individual 
actions take place within the cultural context significant for the worlds of the local 
daily life, in which the dressing codes and the little differentiations of fashion 
establish the personal and cultural identity. The first sense in which culture is 
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important for globalization is exactly the fact that these ―cultural actions‖ get to 
have global consequences (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 39). Certainly, the complexity of 
the chain of consequences involves, simultaneously, the political, economic, and 
technological dimensions of globalization. But the idea is that the ―moment of the 
cultural‖ is indispensable to the interpretation of the complex connexity. If we 
think about the cultural dimension of globalization, we also discover that 
globalization has an essentially dialectic character. The fact that the individual 
actions are intimately linked to the structural-institutional features of the social 
world through reflexivity shows that globalization is not a ―unidirectional‖ process 
by which events are determined by the vast global structures, but involves at least 
the possibility for the local intervention in the global processes. There is a certain 
cultural policy of globality, which we can understand going further with the 
example of the ecological consequences that local actions have. 
Although the capacity to generate consequences of the daily options related to 
lifestyle is not always recognized – most of us are not ―ecologically aware‖ 
consumers when we do our shopping – there is, still, a tendency, in certain sections 
of any society, towards consumption practices deliberately ecological, which 
actually represents a manifestation of connexity. The famous slogan of the 
ecological movement, ―Think globally, act locally‖, suggests a political strategy 
motivated by a very precise collective cultural narration, referring to what ―a good 
living‖ actually means. The strategy implies the mobilization of agents – ever more 
through some elaborated press campaigns – in the direction of obtaining some 
institutional changes at global level. (Tomlinson, 2002, p. 40) And if such a 
strategy is (sometimes) successful, this is due to the fact that it relies on and 
appeals to very general cultural inclinations rather than scientific-technical 
arguments related to environment matters. For example, the astounding victory of 
the Greenpeace organization over the Shell UK company in the matter of the 
abandonment of the Brent Spar oil storage and tanker loading buoy in June, 1995, 
was possible due to the mobilization of the public opinion - especially in Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands - which directly threatened the ―relations with the 
consumer‖ at the gas stations of the Shell company.  
From the perspective of the ecologist movement, this victory may be considered a 
remarkable success of the social reflexivity. But, if we ask ourselves what lied 
behind the mobilization of the public opinion, it is very likely that it was something 
else than the actual problems of the campaign - which caused a considerable 
confusion. For example, it seems that many of those who boycotted the pumps of 
the Shell company thought that the intention actually was to sink the buoy in the 
North Sea – their ―locality‖ – and not in the Atlantic. The members of the 
Greenpeace organization later admitted that they had been misled themselves 
concerning the real chemical composition of the substances on the buoy. Actually, 
after the campaign, it was stated that the press had been tricked into rendering the 
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event in a manner favorable to the Greenpeace organization and offering numerous 
images in which the ecologists were assaulted by the security personnel of the 
Shell company, in detriment of presenting some complex scientific arguments. The 
head editor of the British TV channel Channel 4 stated: ―The images that 
[Greenpeace] placed at our disposal showed a few helicopters daringly flying 
within range of the water canons. Try analyzing that scientifically.‖ (Tomlinson, 
2002, p. 41) Despite all this, we may have another understanding of things if we 
think that this campaign appeals to the narrations of people‘s life rather than to 
specific ecological arguments, the terminology of which would anyhow not be 
understood by too many. Thus, the most significant aspect was, probably, the 
symbolic value of the buoy‘s occupation: a certain dramatization of the ―fight‖ 
against the generalized threat with the degradation of the environment, which 
people feel like being part of the ―world‖ of their own daily life. Thus understood, 
the strategy of the Greenpeace organization is, at least partially, cultural. It may be 
considered that even the matter of the scientific truth has a cultural importance for 
the maintenance of some trust relations generated among Greenpeace (or Shell), 
the press, and the public - both in the terms of information, and of misinformation. 
Today, the politics of the environment implies ―the social construction of reality‖ – 
a press fight among the actors of the ecological protest, the actors in the business 
world, and the decisional factors, on a set of meanings which must be spread 
among laymen and which represent the framework of their reality. The politics of 
the environment is, therefore, a cultural politics, and its success depends on the 
degree by which it enters the relevant horizon of the local daily worlds. Thus, 
culture is important for globalization in the following sense as well: it marks a 




In the context of this study, we understood globalization as a real process, a 
continuum, together with its local, regional, and national implications. At one end 
of this continuous line there are the economic and cultural relations and networks, 
organized locally and/or nationally, and at the other end there are the economic 
cultural relations and networks which take shape at the wider scale of the regional 
and local interactions. We have specified, from the very beginning, that there is a 
high degree of connexity between the two dimensions of the globalization process, 
which we then treated separately. The analysis performed on the economic 
dimension of globalization revealed that the national governments have fewer 
alternatives in negotiating with the multinational companies, for example, if they 
are interested in optimizing the level of the economic growth and maintaining a 
certain living standard for their citizens. Accordingly, the fatality would be that the 
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contemporary experience prove to us that a certain type of commitment as 
compared to the global capitalist economy and, thus, to the global market, is 
unavoidable for the nation-states. We have obviously also considered the issue of 
the economic-social inequalities that the structural modifications of the global 
economy suppose, which today no longer represent only the privilege of the 
―problem-states‖. On the contrary, as we have tried to prove, the states with a 
developed economy are also confronted with such problems; the advantage is, 
however, that a dynamic economy allows for the implementation of certain 
solutions to diminish or attenuate inequalities. However, the question if our era is 
or will become one of inequalities remains. And this because, if the nation-states 
can no longer protect their citizens against the tendencies of the global economy, 
meaning that they can no longer offer certainties as to the work places and living 
standards (if such certainties existed, they were owed, some theorists suggest, to 
―the system of the providence states‖ after the war), it means that the idea of social 
contract itself must be redefined. Globalization undoubtedly poses difficulties, 
because it emphasizes the inegalitarian tendencies which come forth even in the 
developed states, making the exercise of the political power more complex, but it 
does not involve giving up the economic growth. Thus, there is hope that an 
economic growth within reasonable limits may finally determine the attenuation of 
the social inequalities. During the current study, we have permanently referred to 
the interrelations between the dimensions of globalization, and we have also taken 
this into consideration when we have treated the cultural dimension of the process. 
Thus, approaching connexity from this perspective, we have been interested in the 
way globalization changes the context of the construction of meaning: the way in 
which it affects the sense of identity, the experience of the place and self in relation 
to the place, the impact it has on understanding, values, wishes, myths, hopes, and 
fears which developed around a topical life. The cultural dimension, therefore, 
comprises what Anthony Giddens used to call both the ―exteriority‖, and the 
―interiority‖ of globalization: the relation between the ample systematic 
transformations and the transformations of our most intimate and most local 
―worlds‖ in the daily experience. 
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